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Explaining public participation in environmental governance in China 
Dr Neil Munro* 
 
Abstract 
This article uses nationwide survey data to answer two questions: who participates in 
environmental governance in China and why? First, it explores the social structural 
characteristics that distinguish participants, and finds that city dwellers, the more educated, 
those with higher incomes and higher social status are more likely to participate while women, 
the elderly, those with rural residence registration and migrants are less likely. Then it tests 
two main explanations about why people participate in environmental governance—
instrumentality and identity. Participation is associated with attention to conservation issues, 
the perceived effectiveness of local environmental governance, knowledge of environmental 
problems, reading newspapers and magazines, voting in local elections, identification with a 
middle-class lifestyle and observance of Western holidays. Combining the analyses into a 
structural model shows that instrumental and identity-related variables account for nearly all 
of the social structural variation in participation. Participation is thus a function both of 
instrumental considerations and identities. 
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Introduction 
In environmental governance, it has been proposed that looking at who the 
participants are and what motivates them to participate might provide a way of understanding 
how and when collaborative governance approaches are effective (Bodin 2017: 1f). 
Understanding who participates and why is thus an important prerequisite for evaluating the 
importance of public participation. This article seeks to address both of these questions with 
respect to non-contentious forms of participation under the world’s leading authoritarian 
regime, the People’s Republic of China. 
The literature on the determinants of public participation in environmental governance 
mostly deals with participation in democracies. Although early studies focussed on selective 
costs and benefits (Olson 1965) and on resources as explanations (McAdam 1988), these 
approaches have been superseded by instrumental or ‘collective interest’ explanations in 
which resources count as only one of the factors reducing the selective costs of participation, 
and in which collective benefits to the community are of equal or greater importance than 
selective benefits to individuals (Finkel et al. 1989; Finkel et al. 1998; Lubell 2002). Media 
use has been recognised as an important catalyst of participation (Gamson 1992; Wagner 
2007) and identity has been identified as another key driver (Van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans 2010). Participation in environmental governance under authoritarian regimes 
has generally been neglected. 
The literature on the determinants of participation sometimes confuses the ‘who’ and 
‘why’ questions. This has prevented a better understanding the relationship between the kinds 
of people who participate and their motivations for doing so. For example, in Lubell’s (2002: 
433) ‘collective interest’ model of public participation, social structural variables such as 
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income, education, age, gender and ethnic minority status are slotted into an equation for the 
expected value of participation by treating them as variables affecting selective costs. Lubell 
explains (2002: 437) that costs should be lower for educated citizens because they have more 
‘civic skills,’ for young people and for women because they have more time and for ethnic 
majorities because they face less discrimination. Although he finds evidence to support his 
hypotheses about education, youth and majority status in the general population of the US 
(2002: 443f), these data do not actually tell us that the reasons why these groups participate 
more are the reasons which he proposes.  Differentials in participation across the social 
structure give us answers to the question of who participates, but they do not tell us why these 
differentials exist. Although various explanations have been deployed in studies of 
participation, there exists no empirical study which looks at the who and why questions as 
two sides of the same coin and tries to specify the relationships between them.  
Given the Chinese government’s focus on increasing popular participation in 
environmental governance, and intriguing evidence that participation may sometimes ‘work’ 
(see below) there is a need for empirical research on the nature of participation. Individuals 
are the basic unit of analysis, for it is they who through their decisions and preferences drive 
the dynamics of any system where power is distributed (Aligica 2009: 23f). If we are dealing 
with a system which is designed to function with popular participation, the relevant 
individuals are members of the public.  
The present study takes a conventional approach—analysis of a representative 
nationwide sample survey—using a recursive form of censored regression which makes 
simple but realistic assumptions about the structural relations amongst the independent 
variables. It models both their substantive ‘impact’ and statistical significance.  
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The study first explores who participates against a standard battery of social structural 
determinants. It finds that participation is more common amongst city dwellers, the more 
educated, those with higher incomes and higher social status and less common amongst 
women, the elderly, those with rural residence registration and migrants. It tests two main 
explanations about why people participate—instrumentality and identity. Attention to 
conservation issues, the perceived effectiveness of local environmental governance, 
knowledge of environmental problems, the habit of reading newspapers and magazines and 
voting in local elections are all positively associated with participation. In terms of identities, 
identification with a middle-class lifestyle and observance of Western holidays show 
significant positive associations. Structural modelling shows that instrumental and identity-
related variables account for nearly all of the social structural variation in participation.  
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next two sections briefly discuss 
the institutional context of participation in China including the definition of participation, the 
kinds of participation mandated by government policy, and evidence that participation ‘works’ 
in the sense of producing better environmental outcomes. Then the article summarises the 
literature on the determinants of participation and proposes hypotheses, introduces the data 
and method, and presents results. The final two sections discuss the significance of the results 
and offer conclusions. 
 
What Is Public Participation in Environmental Governance in China? 
For some authors, the key criterion of participation is the intention of the participants: 
it thus consists of ‘actions undertaken by ordinary citizens that are intended, directly or 
indirectly, to influence the selection of government personnel and/or the policy decisions they 
make’ (Bennett and Bennett 1986: 160). Others focus on the expansion of the ‘normal’ 
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decision-making forum to include ‘actors who are not routinely engaged’  (Fritsch and Newig 
2012: 183).  Still others emphasise empowerment as a definitional criterion for true 
participation (Rowe and Frewer 2004: 515).  
Following in the same vein, some scholars focus not on participation itself but on its 
function in governance systems. Understanding the function of participation is not a simple 
matter either. Participation may achieve no practical result beyond enhancing the governance 
system’s capacity for reflexivity, or ability to ‘reconfigure themselves in response to 
reflection on performance’ (Dryzek and Pickering 2017: 353). Participation may be 
meaningful only as an opportunity for citizens to claim the ‘power to define social problems 
and construct the identities and interests of particular social groups’ (Gleiss et al. 2018: 4). 
Even in cases where there is not an obvious ‘way in’ to the forum where policy decisions are 
made, participation may still serve a legitimating function.  
Participation in an authoritarian context requires attention to subtle distinctions of 
style, tone, approach or issue area which can radically change the government’s attitude to a 
particular instance of participation. In China for example, Johnson (2010: 430) contrasts 
‘rules-based’ environmental activism, using channels for public participation provided in 
legislation, with ‘not-in-my-backyard’ (NIMBY) activism which sometimes makes use of 
contentious tactics including protests. Authorities have been more tolerant of the NIMBY 
activists, even though their activities are contentious, because their concerns are seen as 
having local rather than national significance. Activists may engage in ‘boundary-spanning’ 
protests which walk a fine line between provoking the authorities and using the law to force 
them to act contrary to their original intentions (O’Brien and Li 2006), and at other times they 
may choose to play it safe by only engaging in participation explicitly sanctioned by the 
government. This article is mainly concerned with non-contentious forms of participation. 
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Since the beginning of this century, a body of legislation has emerged which not only 
encourages but requires Chinese officials to involve the public in environmental decision-
making (Zhang and Wen 2008; Johnson 2010: 431). The government appears to be pursuing 
two goals: to close the ‘enforcement gap’ by involving the public in policy implementation, 
and to steer public concern into channels that enhance the legitimacy of the Communist Party 
and reduce societal conflict (Grano 2016: 132). Public participation first began to be 
implemented as public hearings or consultations on such matters as environmental 
assessment, administrative penalties and urban water tariff setting (Bina 2008: 722; Zhong 
and Mol 2008: 900). This has coincided with an expansion of online participation via public 
comment and contacting of officials through social media and other digital platforms (Ma et 
al. 2009: 77).  
The current national legislation and policy measures mandate the spread of public 
participation across the country. Examples of recent measures include the Guidance on 
Promoting Public Participation issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (now the 
Ministry of Ecology and Environment) in 2014, and the Measures for Public Participation 
issued by the same ministry in 2015. These build upon a framework of legislation which 
provides for public consultation, such as the 2000 Legislation Law (revised in 2015), the 
1989 Environmental Protection Law (revised in 2015), and the 2002 Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) Law (revised in 2016). Emerging common practices include public 
disclosure of environmental pollution information and environmental quality data, public 
participation in siting decisions for projects and in the identification of polluting enterprises 
to be shut down, the provision of public complaint lines, ‘public interest’ environmental 
litigation (even though normally led by prosecutors and government agencies, with only 
selected NGOs allowed to pursue it), and public participation in setting standards. 
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Participation is now placed at the centre of proposals for the reform of China’s environmental 
governance (Bergkamp and Xu 2017). 
Case studies have raised questions about the quality of implementation of public 
participation. For example, Tang et al. (2008) carried out a study of social impact assessment 
and public participation in land requisitions in Guangzhou. Alongside open and transparent 
systems for valuing property and compensating villagers, and such participatory mechanisms 
as hotlines, suggestion boxes, public meetings and consultation with village representatives, 
the local authorities also used such ‘mind-engineering’ techniques as co-opting opinion 
leaders such as village officials and clans leaders, exploiting guanxi ties into the village, 
awarding extra payments to those who signed over their land early, pressuring a lawyer not to 
represent the villagers, and organising high profile visits by senior leaders. Johnson et al. 
(2018) carried out a case study of environmental impact assessment (EIA) and public 
participation in a decision on the siting of a waste incineration plant in Hebei province. There, 
community campaigners discovered evidence of systematic fraud in the public participation 
element of the EIA, and with the help of a network of activists from Beijing, were able to 
launch a successful legal challenge leading to suspension of the project as well as highlight 
widespread problems with the EIA process for a national audience.   
 
The Impact of Participation in Environmental Governance  
In China, at the end of the twentieth century, leading scholars held that public 
participation in environmental governance was of little note because NGOs were tightly 
controlled, and the population too indifferent to play any significant role (Lo and Leung 2000: 
679). Indeed, the first large scale survey of environmental awareness, conducted by the 
Research Centre for Contemporary China in 1998, showed that the population’s 
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understanding of environmental issues, the priority assigned to them, acceptance of shared 
responsibility with government and levels of participation were all very low (Wong 2005: 41-
44).  In the view of one author, China had an ‘anthropocentric’ world view (Harris 2004: 147). 
However, it has been argued that China’s traditional value system, Confucianism, is 
compatible with strong environmental ethics (Nuyen 2011: 550).  
Does participation matter in terms of environmental outcomes?  Wang (2013: 370) 
argues that China’s environmental protection efforts are one way in which the Chinese 
regime attempts to enhance its legitimacy, but their effects are not confined to legitimacy. He 
contends (2013: 381) that the chief mechanism for promoting environmental protection is the 
cadre evaluation system, which determines promotion criteria for all senior public officials in 
China. The system includes three basic types of targets, distinguished by their degree of 
obligatoriness: soft targets (zhidaoxing zhibiao), hard targets (ying zhibiao), and veto targets 
(yipiao foujue mubiao). From the beginning of the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010), 
environmental targets were increasingly classified as binding, and some even as veto targets. 
Wang (2013: 372)  further argues that ‘public supervision’ reforms including public 
participation as well as measures to promote transparency and broaden the possibilities of 
public interest litigation, are among the most significant measures in support of the cadre 
evaluation reforms. This is because public supervision is aimed at addressing the principal-
agent problems inherent in the use of cadre evaluation, such as ‘goal specification, goal 
displacement, data falsification and collusion’ (2013: 374). Public participation adds an extra 
layer of accountability. In theory, this could mean both more accountability to the central 
government, because public supervision can short circuit the reporting chain, and more 
accountability to the public, because participation provides various means for them to voice 
concerns. Compared to the top-down accountability of bureaucratic monitoring systems and 
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to market incentives, Wang argues that public supervision is a ‘more diffuse and independent 
accountability that is less susceptible to gaming and political manipulation’ (2013: 439).  
There is some, albeit not entirely conclusive, evidence that public participation 
produces positive environmental outcomes, at least at the aggregate level of provinces. Wu et 
al. (2018) tested the effects of letters and visits and numbers of NGOs on two air and two 
water pollution indicators, controlling for whether or not the province had implemented 
performance assessment, its GDP per capita, industrial structure, foreign investment and size 
of fiscal deficit. They found (2018: 235) that the number of petitions reduced wastewater, but 
not other types of pollution. Zhang and Chen (2018) studied the impact on pollution of 
numbers of complaints per capita, controlling for government investment in pollution control, 
industrial investment in pollution prevention, the proportion of FDI in GDP and the 
proportion of the technological market turnover in GDP. They found (2018: 12-14) that 
participation was associated with less pollution for each of four types of pollution, SO2, NOx, 
COD and NH4. SO2 pollution fell more sharply than water pollution,  with more and stronger 
pollution reducing effects in the eastern region than in central and western China. Moreover, 
the effects of participation on reduction of SO2 was stronger than the effects of government 
and enterprise investment in pollution reduction.  
 
Literature on Determinants of Participation and Hypotheses 
It is a staple of the participation literature that an individual’s resources determine his 
or her availability and capability to participate (McAdam 1988). In a study of environmental 
activism using the US General Social Survey (GSS) and local survey data, Lubell (2002) 
treated resources as elements affecting selective costs of participation. He found (2002: 443) 
that youth and education have positive effects.  
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The empirical literature on Chinese participation tends to confirm that position in the 
social structure matters, but how it matters seems to depend in part on the degree to which 
participation is contentious. Thus, Munro (2013) used China General Social Survey (CGSS) 
data from 2006 to explain willingness to join environmental NGOs. Similar to Lubell’s study, 
he found (2013: 69) found that youth and education were associated with more willingness to 
join environmental NGOs. However, Zeng et al. (2018) used 2010 CGSS data to explain 
whether or not respondents who were aware of protests, strikes, boycotts or other forms of 
collective action, took part either as an organizer, participant or supporter. They found (2018: 
1568) that education was associated with less involvement in collective action and age had no 
effect. Alongside age and education, we need to consider gender, social status, income, 
urbanisation and, in China, whether the individual has an agricultural or non-agricultural 
residence registration (hukou) and has migrated from their home town or province.1 Higher 
income presumably makes public participation easier to afford, but it may also define class 
interests which militate against joining environmental causes. Munro (2013: 68) found that 
income associated with less willingness to join environmental NGOs, but Zeng et al. (2018: 
1568) found it had no effect. We can note that in Liu et al.’s (2018: 29) survey-based study of 
protest, petitioning, and taking part in cyber discussions and community meetings to resist 
locally unpopular land use (LULU) decisions in Hong Kong,  income was associated with 
greater willingness to get involved in protests. Since we are mainly dealing with non-
contentious forms of participation in this article, the following hypothesis is proposed: (H1) 
people occupying favourable positions in the social structure (men, youth, non-migrants, 
those with non-agricultural residence registration, living closer to city and town centres, with 
higher status and incomes and more education) are more likely to participate in 
environmental governance.  
																																																													
1	Type and location of hukou registration determines access to local services in China. The agricultural/non-
agricultural distinction, sometimes called ‘rural/urban,’ was abandoned in 2014, but place of registration still 
determines access to services in most locations.	
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Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010: 179) point to instrumental motives as a 
key driver of participation. Lubell’s (2002: 433) formula for calculating the expected value of 
participation includes both selective and collective benefits, as well as a term for efficacy. 
This approach builds on work by Olson (1965) who argued that motives mainly take the form 
of selective benefits, available to the participant only, and also on work by Finkel et al. (1989, 
1998), who argued that collective benefits are equally important. Lubell (2002: 443) finds 
that severity of environmental threat and personal efficacy, treated as part of the collective 
benefit of participation, as well as environmental values and environmental knowledge, 
treated as part of selective benefits and costs respectively, are predictors of activism and 
intended activism in the US.  
Studies of public participation in China provide some support to the instrumental 
explanation. Munro (2013: 68) found that the belief that oneself or one’s family has suffered 
harm from pollution, identification of the local environment as a priority, satisfaction with the 
neighbourhood and recognition of the seriousness of global environmental problems were all 
associated with willingness to join environmental NGOs. Zeng et al. (2018: 1568) found that 
having an interest in an issue predicted taking part in collective action. Case-based studies 
likewise emphasise the importance of collective interests (Li et al. 2012: 66). Liu et al. (2018: 
28-32) found that seeing oneself as a victim of a LULU siting decision predicted participation 
in protests in Hong Kong, as did area of residence and distance from the site (Liu et al. 2018: 
32). Instrumental explanations lead to the following hypotheses: (H2a) people who assign 
environmental issues a high priority, and/or (H2b) positively evaluate the environmental 
capacity of the local authorities, and/or (H2c) are knowledgeable of environmental issues are 
more likely to participate in environmental governance. 
Media use exposes people to collective action frames which can inspire and legitimate 
participation (Gamson 1992; Wagner 2007). Steinhardt (2015) argued that in the first decade 
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of this century the Chinese mass media increasingly took a sympathetic attitude towards 
protest activities, reflecting structural transformations in the public sphere, and taking 
advantage of a shift from censorship to pro-active propaganda. Munro (2013: 69) found that 
frequency of reading periodicals and watching television predicted willingness to join 
environmental NGOs in China. Media use can be thought of as part of the selective costs 
term of Lubell’s equation: people participate because they have been cued, stimulated, 
mobilised or inspired by the information they receive from the mass media, thus lowering 
their threshold for action.  This leads to: (H2d) people who engage with the media intensively 
are more likely to participate in environmental governance. 
Political engagement in spheres other than environmental governance can be expected 
to enhance an individual’s efficacy, as the experience gained is presumably transferable. 
Munro (2013: 68) found that those who expressed in willingness to vote, recommend a 
candidate, or attend sessions of the local people’s congress were more willing to join 
environmental NGOs in China. ‘Bridging’ social capital which links different communities  
and, within that category, social capital which links people across power gradients in society 
is thought to be especially useful in sustaining capacity for collective action (Szreter and 
Woolcock 2003: 129). Munro (2013: 69) found that Communist Party membership and 
knowing public sector workers enhanced willingness to join environmental NGOs. However, 
Zeng et al. (2018: 1568) found that Communist Party membership had no significant 
association with involvement in collective action. Given that this article is focussed on non-
contentious forms of participation, we would expect that: (H2e) people who participate 
politically in other spheres and (H2f) Communist Party members are more likely to 
participate in environmental governance. 
Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010: 179) point to social identity as a key 
driver of participation. Identity is thought to provide the basis for collectively experienced 
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emotions linking perceived injustice to the need for collective action, for politicising such 
action, channelling it into specific forms of organization, and for predicting structural and 
incidental collective disadvantage (Van Zomeren et al. 2008: 510).  Tsang and Lee (2013) 
note the connection between middle-class identity and environmental NGOs in China, 
although they exhibit scepticism about the genuineness of these NGOs’ social conscience. 
Rocca (2017: 175) has pointed to the connection between ‘middle-class’ identity, Inglehart’s  
(1990) concept of ‘postmaterial’ values and environmentalism. According to this line of 
argument, China’s emergent ‘middle-class’ has satisfied their basic material needs, and 
internalised some ‘higher’ aspirations, including a better environment.   
The problem with using the term ‘middle-class’ in China is that it has no agreed 
definition. While a variety of objective and subjective criteria have been proposed—for a 
review see Miao (2017)—none is fully satisfactory. As Rocca (2017: 11) puts it the middle-
class ‘is less a group of people than a way of thinking and foreseeing the structures of 
Chinese society, a part of the new social imaginary China is elaborating.’ Goodman (2014: 49) 
argues that the middle-class is ‘more a discourse than social structure.’  Since we have 
already considered the role of social structure, which includes both income and social status, 
the missing dimensions of discourse which capture ‘middle-classness’ need to be defined.  
Two dimensions appear salient in the literature. The first is the extent to which 
Chinese citizens identify themselves as middle-class (Zhang 2017). This is related to what 
Weber calls an ‘acquisition class,’ determined by the opportunity its members have to 
‘exploit services in the market’ (Weber 1947: 424). The context for this is that China’s period 
of ‘Reform and Opening Up’ in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with neoliberal economic 
policies which delivered improved standards of living and allowed some Chinese to enjoy 
high consumption lifestyles (Nonini 2008). As Simpson (2014: 827) argues, this development 
trajectory has demanded from its citizens that they ‘re-imagine’ themselves, no longer as 
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workers and peasants, but as global consumers, able to afford a high quality of life. 
Consumption for this class may be not an end in itself, but a marker of identity. 
The second important discursive dimension of ‘middle-classness’ is the degree to 
which citizens identify with what in the Chinese context is sometimes called ‘joining rails’ 
(jiegui), meaning catching up with global trends. The associations between development, 
environmentalism and globalisation in the sense of ‘joining the world’ became a part of the 
Communist Party’s constitution in 2017, with the adoption of the concept of the ‘community 
of common destiny’ (Lams 2018). However, the association was evident in Chinese discourse 
long before that. Munro (2013: 69) found that support for China’s involvement in UN 
peacekeeping missions, sending medical teams to Africa and acceptance of foreign books, 
films and music were all associated with greater willingness to join environmental NGOs. We 
can see in this example the associations between environmentalism, openness to foreign 
cultures and acceptance of the political demands of globalisation. On the basis of the 
foregoing discussion, we can offer the following two hypotheses: (H3a) people who identify 
themselves with a middle-class lifestyle and (H3b) people with a ‘cosmopolitan’ identity are 
more likely to participate in environmental governance. 
 
Data and Method  
 This study uses data from the China General Social Survey (CGSS) of 2013, 
conducted by Professor Li Lulu’s team  at Renmin University of China 
(http://cgss.ruc.edu.cn). Part of an annual programme running since 2003, CGSS focusses on 
economic conditions and value change. The 2013 round included a module on participation in 
environmental governance.2 The survey targeted adults age 18 and over, using face to face 
																																																													
2	The 2015 round of CGSS, which is the latest publicly available dataset, did not include any of these questions. 
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interviews. The sample was designed in two parts. First, a core group of 36 provincial-level 
cities, provincial capitals and important second tier cities were chosen based on their GDP, 
numbers of teachers per capita and level of foreign direct investment. This included the five 
biggest cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Tianjin. Within the 36 cities, a 
three-stage random sampling process identified streets, neighbourhoods and households, with 
an overall target of 2000 households. Second, a further 19 cities and 31 counties from those 
outside the core group were randomly  selected with probability of being selected weighted 
by their factor score computed from population density, urban population ratio and GDP per 
capita. Within each of these PPS sampling identified streets or townships, villages or 
neighbourhoods; and households, with a target of 10,000 households. The proportion of 
urban to rural households was set at a ratio of 6:4, and target sample sizes were adjusted to 
make up for differential response rates across the various strata. These procedures resulted  in 
a sample covering 28 provinces and provincial-level cities; 127 counties,  county-level cities 
or districts; 350 townships or streets; and 452 villages or neighbourhoods. The unweighted 
sample size was 10,724 respondents. With post-stratification weights applied to achieve a 
closer match to census data, the effective sample size was 10,746. The response rate was 
72.2%. For reasons of ‘secrecy,’ the names of the jurisdictions at county level and below 
were suppressed from the publicly available version of the file.3 
 The survey included the following item: Q. I would like to ask, in the past year have 
you engaged in any of the following activities or behaviours? (Never; Sometimes; Often): 
Refuse sorting; Discussing environmental problems with friends and relatives; Taking a 
shopping basket or bag with you when going shopping for necessities; Re-using plastic bags; 
Donating money to environmental protection; Seeking out broadcasts, TV programmes and 
news reports on environmental issues and environmental information; Enthusiastically 
																																																													
3 Email communication from CGSS (cgss@ruc.edu.cn) dated 14 January 2019.	
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joining environmental education activities organised by government or your employer; 
Enthusiastically taking part in environmental protection activities organised by NGOs; 
Cultivating trees or green spaces at own expense;  Enthusiastically joining environmental 
petitions and lawsuits. None of these activities are contentious, with the possible exception of 
the last depending on the target of the petition or lawsuit and the nature of the respondent’s 
involvement. The survey item thus focusses on forms of participation which are mandated by 
the authorities as well as on environmentally responsible behaviours. Replies are summarised 
in Table 1.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 A principal components analysis shows that the different forms of participation 
correlate with two main factors (Table 2). Five forms of participation correlate at above 0.60 
with the first factor. These are: taking part in environmental protection activities organised by 
NGOs, taking part in environmental education activities organised by government or by 
employers, joining environmental petitions or lawsuits, donating money to environmental 
causes and taking part in tree planting or cultivation of green spaces at one’s own expense. 
These actions all involve some kind of organizational effort directed at influencing others 
through example or advocacy to protect the environment and are not simply individual 
consumer behaviours. The intention to influence is a feature shared in common with Lubell’s 
(2002) measure of participation in the US, which tapped being a member of a group that aims 
to protect the environment, signing an environmentalist petition and taking part in a protest or 
demonstration on an environmental issue. Two forms of participation correlate at above 0.60 
with the second factor. Both are concerned with the reduction of plastic bag waste. The 
remaining three behaviours—discussing environmental issues, refuse sorting and following 
environmental issues in the media--cross-load on both factors, although more strongly with 
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the second than the first. The variables loading stronger on the second factor are thus more 
concerned with personal consumption and lifestyle choices than with influencing.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 To construct a measure of participation in environmental governance, the five items 
loading on the first factor are averaged, with ‘never’ coded zero, ‘sometimes’ coded one, and 
‘often’ coded two, producing a scale from zero to two, with a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.76 
indicating good reliability (Table 3). On this scale, the median respondent scores zero and the 
mean respondent scores 0.19, with a standard deviation of 0.32.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 The hypotheses are operationalised with a selection of measures commonly used in 
Chinese social science surveys. Hypothesis 1 is tested with gender, age, social status, income 
quintile and education scales. In addition, the measures include whether or not the respondent 
has rural residence registration (hukou) and whether he or she is a migrant from another city 
or county.  Hypothesis 2a concerning environmental priority is tested using a question on 
whether respondents have heard of a list of 12 environmental problems and how serious they 
are. Principal components analysis shows that these problems load on two factors: the first is 
concerned with pollution issues and the second with nature conservation. Scores for the 
seriousness of the problems loading on a common factor are multiplied by the answer for 
whether the respondent has heard of each, and then the products are averaged to form scales 
(see note 1 in Table 4). Hypothesis 2b concerning performance uses an assessment of local 
government environmental capacity, and Hypothesis 2c uses a measure of knowledge of 
environmental problems. Hypothesis 2d draws on a set of measures of frequency of use of 
print media, television and the internet.  Hypotheses 2e is tested by whether the respondent 
voted in the most recent village committee or community council elections, which are the 
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highest level at which electoral competition is allowed in China. Hypothesis 2f is tested by 
whether the respondent a Communist Party or Communist Youth League member. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b concerning ‘middle-class’ identity and cosmopolitanism draw 
on two multi-item scales. The first is a measure of whether the respondent identifies with the 
type of high consumption lifestyle which has only recently become available to people with 
good paid employment or independent sources of income. It is based on a list of 13 
statements, six of which concern a high consumption lifestyle and load on a common factor 
in a principal component analysis (see note 5 in Table 4). The items exhibit good reliability  
(Cronbach’s alpha 0.82) and so are used to form a scale.  The second scale is a measure of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ based on whether the respondent celebrates five Western holidays from a 
list of 14 traditional and Western holidays. Again, celebrating these five holidays shows good 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha 0.79).  Details of coding, scale construction, and summary 
statistics for all the independent variables are given in Table 4 below.  
[Table 4 about here] 
The author uses maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors to carry 
out two regression analyses which are censored from below on the assumption that 
participation can never fall below ‘zero.’ The first regression focuses on the ‘who’ question 
and includes only the social structural determinants needed to test Hypothesis 1. The second 
focuses on the ‘why’ question and includes also the instrumental and identity measures 
needed to test Hypotheses 2a-f and 3a and 3b. To identify and remove influential cases, 
Cooks Distance was calculated for the second model and the model was then re-run 
repeatedly to discover the threshold value above which the inclusion of the outliers caused 
changes in the significant variables. Twenty-four influential cases were then excluded from 
the analysis. 
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The second model assumes that social structural determinants can have indirect 
effects via the other variables in the model, with the coefficient for an indirect path being 
computed as the product of the coefficients of the connecting paths. All other effects are 
assumed to be direct. Because of the large N of the survey, the minimum significance level is 
set at P<.01. 
 
Results 
 The results support Hypothesis 1 because the effects of social structure are substantial 
and in the expected directions (Table 5).  Since all the social structural variables except rural 
residence registration and urbanisation are significant at .01 level in Model 1, we can 
conclude that participation in environmental governance is highly structured. Women, the 
elderly and migrants are less likely to participate, while those with higher social status, 
income and education and more likely to participate.  
To understand the reasons for participation, we need to look at Model 2. All of the 
social structural effects except for migrant status lose significance, which suggests that who 
participates is almost completely accounted for by the instrumental and identity explanations. 
In terms of instrumentality, the seriousness of conservation issues, local government 
environmental capacity, reading newspapers and magazines, voting and Communist Party 
membership are positive influences, and watching television is a negative influence. All these 
findings, except the last, confirm the hypotheses. In terms of identity, both middle-class 
lifestyle and cosmopolitanism have significant effects in the expected directions, again 
confirming the hypotheses.  
Model 2 allows for indirect effects, since all of the social structural variables are 
assumed to influence the ‘instrumentality’ and ‘identity’ variables. This allows us to gauge 
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the direct and indirect effects of all the variables and compare their magnitude by computing 
impacts, calculated as the mean of the independent variable multiplied by the sum of the 
estimates for all direct and indirect effects significant at .01 level. This procedure shows that 
the biggest positive impacts are from middle-class lifestyle (impact .38), education 
(impact .28), reading newspapers and magazines (.21), local government environmental 
capacity (.10), the seriousness of conservation issues (.09), self-assessed social status (.09) 
and urbanisation (.05), and the biggest negative impacts are from watching television (-.09) 
and age (-.07), with rural residence registration and migrant status as minor negative 
influences (-.02) and female gender as a cross-pressured influence with a small net negative 
effect (-.01). The notes in the Table detail which intervening variables mediate the indirect 
effects of social structure.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Discussion 
Confirmation of the instrumental hypotheses does not distinguish China much from, 
for example, US environmental participation as analysed by Lubell (2002). This is not  
surprising in the light of the studies reviewed above which suggested that participation 
‘works’ in the sense of sometimes producing better environmental outcomes. It would only 
be a surprise if our prior expectations were that participation under an authoritarian regime is 
all a charade, aimed at legitimising the government, and does not really affect outcomes. 
Lubell’s rationalistic explanation of why people participate is therefore to some extent 
applicable in China, once one allows for the more conservative nature of Chinese society, and 
its more restrictive approach to participation. More broadly, the analysis corroborates 
instrumental models of political participation based on assumptions that people participate in 
order to pursue collective benefits (Finkel et al. 1989; Finkel and Muller 1998). 
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The non-confrontational, government-led nature of most participation in China’s 
environmental governance is underlined by the positive association between government 
environmental capacity and participation. We can interpret this as an indirect corroboration of 
Johnson’s (2010) distinction between ‘rules-based’ environmental activism, which has 
worked with the spirit of government legislation to institutionalise public participation, and 
NIMBYism, which has occasionally adopted more contentious tactics to force local officials 
to adhere to procedural rules allowing participation. However, just as ‘environmental 
distribution conflicts’ have from time to time exposed sub-standard forms of participation 
which aim to frustrate rather than facilitate genuine public input into decision-making 
(Johnson et al. 2018), we can also interpret the finding to mean that those who give a low 
evaluation to government capacity may stay away from public participation. 
Scholars have argued that the Chinese mass media, as a servant of the Chinese 
government, has promoted efforts to expand orderly participation in environmental 
governance (Ma et al. 2009; Steinhardt 2015). A study using comparable data from the US 
and China found that breadth of media use associated positively with local and global 
environmental concern and willingness to sacrifice for the environment in China, and with 
local concern and willingness to sacrifice in the US (Zhao 2012: 150f). Other studies in the 
US looking at the relationship between intensity of television watching and environmental 
concern and willingness to sacrifice for the environment find a negative relationship 
(Shanahan, Morgan et al. 1997; Good 2007; Good 2009). The present study thus corroborates 
the finding that breadth of media use is a positive influence but watching television is a 
negative influence, and underlines, again, that Chinese citizens are not that different from 
their US counterparts.  It is noteworthy that the indirect impact of education operates in part 
through consumption of newspapers and magazines (indirect impact .08 out of total indirect 
impact of .28). 
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The perceived seriousness of pollution does not seem to matter, whereas the 
seriousness of conservation issues associates positively with participation in environmental 
governance. Environmental groups in the West have long known that images of pristine 
wilderness and emblematic species have more motivating power than the nitty gritty of 
pollution control. However, it is likely that the explanation for this difference is more 
complicated. Lubell (2002) argues that ‘environmental activism’ is a function of citizens’ 
beliefs about collective benefits, ability to determine collective outcomes and the selective 
costs and benefits which accrue from activism. Later work by the same author makes the 
connection between trust in policy elites’ ability to deal with a specific issue and willingness 
to act over that issue (Lubell et al. 2006: 140). We should note that Chinese citizens regard 
pollution as a more serious problem than nature conservation (see Table 4). It seems likely 
that they have less trust in the government’s ability to tackle polluting industries than its 
ability to save endangered habitats and wildlife, and this could explain why the seriousness 
with which conservation issues are viewed is a better predictor of activism.  
Confirmation of the identity hypotheses is striking, particularly the huge impact of 
identifying with a middle-class lifestyle. Inglehart (1995: 57) contended that ‘Public support 
for environmental protection is …shaped by subjective cultural values.’ The cultural values 
he was referring to, emphasizing self-expression and quality of life, are also consistent with 
middle-class aspirations in China, even if environmentalism as a social movement has not 
escaped the controlling tentacles of the state (Rocca 2017: 177). It is ironic that the path to a 
more engaged, environmentally active Chinese citizen lies through the spread of middle-class 
aspirations, because realising those aspirations involves heightened consumption, but that is 
part and parcel of the logic of post-materialism: only after achieving a certain level of 
prosperity do people focus on more ‘spiritual’ values including environmental aesthetics, 
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quality of life and wellbeing (Inglehart 1990, 1995). At least with respect to 
environmentalism, cosmopolitanism in China seems to align with a middle-class lifestyle.   
 
Conclusion 
The contribution of this study is to provide an empirical account of participation in 
environmental governance as the Chinese regime encourages it to be. By separating the who 
question and the why questions, the article is able to offer an explanation of participation 
which combines the advantages of the collective interest model which seeks to locate the 
motives for participation in instrumental rationality and the advantages of identity models 
which engage with the psychology of participation and its cultural politics. The study also 
encourages a more nuanced understanding of what participation means in an authoritarian 
context and challenges stereotypical views of participation under authoritarianism. 
This study has a number of limitations. First, as a cross-sectional study, it can only tell 
us about associations, not processes of causation. Second, the measure used taps a certain 
kind of participation, within the limits imposed by China’s political system and what 
questions can be asked in a publicly available survey. It does not capture contentious 
activities. Third, it does not provide the institutional analysis which could tell us to what 
extent and in what circumstances public participation actually matters in determining 
environmental decision-making.  
Further study is needed in a number of areas. First, we need to better understand the 
effects of context, including spatial and temporal variations in economic and social 
development, industrial structure, policy and leadership. Because the Chinese government 
suppresses much granular data about local government performance, it is unlikely that the 
breakthrough will come using statistical approaches. Qualitative studies and institutional 
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analyses based on game theoretic models are required to deepen our understanding of the 
relationship between context and participation. It also remains to be discovered exactly why 
different forms of media consumption affect participation in the way they do: whether it is 
because of the way environmental issues are covered, the values conveyed by the media, or 
the nature of the consumption activity itself. Finally, further research is needed to understand 
the expectations of Chinese citizens, in particular which problems they expect government to 
solve, and how and why they see their own participation contributing to the solutions.
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TABLE 1. Frequency of Forms of Participation in Environmental Governance in China 
 Never Sometimes Often 
 (percent) 
Re-using plastic bags 19 31 50 
Taking a shopping basket or bag with me when going shopping for 
necessities 
24 35 41 
Refuse sorting  56 31 13 
Seeking out broadcasts, TV programmes and news reports on 
environmental issues and environmental information 
51 36 13 
Discussing environmental problems with friends and relatives 52 40 8 
Enthusiastically joining environmental education activities 
organised by government or employer 
78 18 4 
Cultivating trees or green spaces at own expense 86 11 3 
Donating money to environmental protection 83 15 2 
Enthusiastically taking part in environmental protection activities 
organised by public-organised NGOs 
84 14 2 
Enthusiastically joining environmental petitions and lawsuits 91 8 1 
China General Social Survey 2013, weighted N=10746 (missing data less than 1% for each 
question, omitted) 
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TABLE 2. Principal Components Analysis of Different Forms of Participation 
 F1 F2 
Enthusiastically taking part in environmental protection activities organised 
by NGOs .78* .17 
Enthusiastically joining environmental education activities organised by 
government or employer .74* .27 
Enthusiastically joining environmental petitions and lawsuits .69* .01 
Donating money to environmental protection .64* .20 
Cultivating trees or green spaces at own expense .60* -.07 
Taking a shopping basket or bag with me when going shopping for 
necessities -.04 .77* 
Re-using plastic bags -.11 .75* 
Discussing environmental problems with friends and relatives .38 .57 
Refuse sorting  .32 .53 
Seeking out broadcasts, TV programmes and news reports on environmental 
issues and environmental information .44 .51 
Eigen values: 3.47 1.53 
% variance explained: 34.7 15.3 
China General Social Survey 2013, weighted N=10746 (missing data coded to mean; varimax 
rotation with Kaiser normalization completed) 
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TABLE 3. Distribution of Measure of Participation in Environmental Governance 
 Frequency  Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 never any of five 6719  62.6 62.6 
>0, ≤0.20 1564  14.6 77.2 
>0.20, ≤0.40 949  8.8 86.0 
>0.40, ≤0.60 559  5.2 91.3 
>0.60, ≤0.80 393  3.7 94.9 
>0.80, ≤1.00 284  2.6 97.6 
>1.00, ≤1.20 126  1.2 98.7 
>1.20, ≤1.40 62  0.6 99.3 
>1.40, ≤1.60 50  0.5 99.8 
>1.60, ≤1.80 12  0.1 99.9 
>1.80, ≤2.00 often all five 10  0.1 100.0 
 
Total 10728  100   
China General Social Survey 2013, weighted N=10746 (missing data 0.1%, omitted) 
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TABLE 4. Coding and Summary Statistics of Variables Included in the Analysis  
 Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Participation 0 Never 2 Often 0.19 0.32 
 Hypothesis 1. SOCIAL STRUCTURE   
Female 0 No 1 Yes 0.50 0.50 
Age in deciles 2 18-29 7 70s 4.62 1.62 
Self-assessed social status 1 Lowest 8 High 4.22 1.66 
Income quintile  1 Lowest 5 Highest 3.00 1.41 
Education 1 Primary- 4 University+ 2.14 1.10 
Rural residence registration (hukou) 0 No 1 Yes 0.53 0.50 
Migrant from another city/county 0 No 1 Yes 0.11 0.31 
Urbanisation 1 Rural 5 Urban 3.14 1.79 
 Hypotheses 2a-f. INSTRUMENTALITY     
Seriousness of pollution1  0 No problems 5 Many serious 2.02 1.37 
Seriousness of conservation issues1 0 No problems 5 Many serious 0.98 1.15 
Local gov’t environmental capacity 1 Superficial 5 Many successes 3.15 1.05 
Knowledge of environmental problems2 0 None 7 Strong 3.04 1.95 
Watches TV 1 Never 5 Very often 4.07 1.01 
Reads newspapers, magazines3 1 Never 5 Very often 1.96 1.03 
Uses internet, customised news on mobile4 1 Never 5 Very often 1.87 1.16 
Voted in community election 0 No 1 Yes 0.45 0.50 
Communist Party/CYL member 0 No 1 Yes 0.14 0.35 
  Hypothesis 3a-b. IDENTITY   
Middle-class lifestyle suits me5 1 Not at all  4 Completely 1.65 0.57 
Cosmopolitan: observes Western holidays6 0 None 5  holidays 0.68 1.26 
China General Social Survey 2013, weighted N=10746; missing data less than 1% for all variables 
except for income (19.0%), local government environmental capacity (16.9%), and voting (4.96%).   
Notes:  
1. From questions asking respondents first if they have heard of a list of 12 environmental problems, 
and second to what extent they think these problems are serious. To construct scales, a principal 
component analysis is used to identify two factors. The first correlates with perceived seriousness of 
air (0.83), water (0.79), noise (0.76), industrial (0.70) and household waste (0.67) pollution, and the 
second with perceived seriousness of loss of wild plants and animals (0.76), forest damage (0.76), 
desertification (0.74), decline in soil quality (0.73) and water shortages (0.59). Scores loading on 
each factor are multiplied by the answers for having heard of the problem, coded zero or one, and 
then averaged. Cronbach’s alpha for seriousness of pollution is 0.84 and for conservation 0.80.  
2. From a list of ten true or false statements about dangers of exhaust fumes, excessive fertilizer use, 
phosphorus containing detergent, fluorine gas from refrigerators, sources of acid rain, ecological 
connectedness, air and water quality standards, monocultures, and global warming, the number of 
correct answers is used as a scale, with the top three points collapsed. 
3. Average of newspaper and magazine reading (Cronbach’s alpha 0.79). 
4. Average use of the internet (including mobile internet) and customised news services on mobile 
phones (Cronbach’s alpha 0.67). 
5. From a list of thirteen statements concerning lifestyle, a principal component analysis shows six 
statements correlating at above 0.60 with a common factor: buying things at famous stores (0.76), 
buying famous brands of consumer durables (0.76), always riding in a taxi or private car (0.72), 
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marking special occasions in restaurants (0.69), decorating our home with works of art (0.69) and 
enjoying art and music in one’s spare time (0.60). Agreement with all six exhibits good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha 0.82) and so they are averaged to form a scale measuring identification with a 
middle-class lifestyle. 
6. From a list of fourteen traditional Chinese and Western holidays, celebrating five Western 
holidays—Christmas, April Fools, St Valentine’s Day, and Mother’s and Father’s Day—forms a 
scale with good reliability (Cronbach’s alpha 0.79). 
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TABLE 5. Regressions on Participation in Environmental Governance 
     Model 1       Model 2 
 Est. S.E Est. S.E Impact† 
Hypothesis 1. SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Female -.07*** .02 -.04 .02 -.01 1 
Age in deciles -.04*** .01 -.01 .01 -.07 2 
Self-assessed social status .03*** .01 .01 .01 .09 3 
Income quintile  .03** .01 -.01 .01 .08 4 
Education .15*** .01 .04** .01 .28 5 
Rural residence registration (hukou) -.07 .03 -.03 .03 -.02 6 
Migrant from another city/county -.13*** .03 -.12*** .03 -.02 7 
Urbanisation .02 .01 -.004 .01 .05 8 
Hypothesis 2a-f. INSTRUMENTALITY      
Seriousness of pollution  - - -.001 .01  
Seriousness of conservation issues - - .09*** .01 .09 
Local gov’t environmental capacity - - .03*** .01 .10 
Knowledge of environmental problems - - .03*** .01 .08 
Watches TV - - -.02*** .01 -.09 
Reads newspapers, magazines - - .11*** .01 .21 
Uses internet, customised news on mobile - - .01 .01  
Voted in community election - - .11*** .02 .05 
Communist Party/CYL member - - .05 .02  
Hypothesis 3a-b. IDENTITY      
Middle-class lifestyle suits me - - .23*** .02 .38 
Cosmopolitan: observes Western holidays - - .04*** .01 .03 
Model fit statistics: Model 1: R-Square: 15.3%; Model 2: R-Square: 24.3%. 
Regression parameters average five imputations of missing data (n=8608 each). Significance 
levels are shown as *** (P<.001), ** (P<.005), * (P<.01). †Impact is calculated as the mean 
of the independent variable multiplied by the product of estimates for all direct and indirect 
effects significant at .01 level. Total impact may not equal the sum of individual impacts due 
to rounding. 
Notes:  
1. Indirect impact via: Party membership (-.002), cosmopolitanism (.002), seriousness of 
conservation issues (-.007), and reads newspapers (-.007). 
2. Indirect impact via: Party membership (.003), voting (.027), middle-class lifestyle (-.053), 
cosmopolitanism (-.039), seriousness of conservation issues (-.031), local government 
environmental capacity (.009), watches TV (-.004) and reads newspapers (.017). 
3. Indirect impact via: Party membership (.002), middle-class lifestyle (.055), 
cosmopolitanism (.010), local government environmental capacity (.007), watches TV (-
.005) and reads newspapers (.022). 
4. Indirect impact via: middle-class lifestyle (.053), reads newspapers (.024). 
5. Indirect impact via: Party membership (.013), middle-class lifestyle (.061), 
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cosmopolitanism (.017), seriousness of conservation issues (.033) and reads newspapers 
(.081). 
6. Indirect impact via middle-class lifestyle (-.007), watches TV (.002) and reads newspapers 
(-.011).  
7. Sum of direct impact (-.013) and indirect impact via voting (-.003). 
8. Indirect impact via voting (-.019), middle-class lifestyle (.028), cosmopolitanism (.010) 
and reads newspapers (.027). 
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